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COMMENTS
GUARDIAN OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPLICATION OF
THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IN SALINGER
v. RANDOM HOUSE, INC.
The Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright laws1
in order to provide individuals with an economic incentive to fur-
ther the development of new and creative ideas.2 The economic in-
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution provides for copyright protection in
order "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." Id.
The first copyright laws were developed in England, as a result of an attempt by the
Crown to control the newly invented printing press. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 3 (1967). "Control" was given to the stationer in the form of an exclusive right to
print certain books for an unlimited period of time. See A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 2-3
(5th ed. 1979). In 1710, the Statute of Anne was enacted in an effort to limit the duration of
the period of exclusivity, see B. KAPLAN, supra, at 7, as well as recognize the rights of au-
thors in their works. See A. LATMAN, supra, at 3. This statute served as the basis of subse-
quent copyright legislation enacted in England and America. See id.
America's first copyright statute was passed in 1790 "for the encouragement of learning,
by securing the copies of maps, charts and books to the authors ... during the times therein
mentioned." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. After numerous amendments to the
copyright laws, a comprehensive revision was undertaken which resulted in the passage of
the Copyright Act of 1909. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562-63 n.17 (1973). The
present copyright statute is codified at Title 17 of the United States Code. See 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810 (1982). For a discussion of the history of copyright laws, see generally H. BALL, THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY §§ 3-5, at 16-37 (1944) (outlining history of
English and American statutes); L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-19
(1968) (overview of emergence of copyright); F. SKONE JAMES & E. SKONE JAMES, COPENGER
AND SKONE JAMES ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 5-15 (9th ed. 1958) (historical view of copyright
laws); Brittin, Constitutional Fair Use, 28 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 141, 146-50 (1982)
(discussing history and purpose of copyrights).
2 See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1909). Early American copyright development recognized several pur-
poses underlying the protection afforded an author's work. See L. PATTERSON, supra note 1,
at 180-202. Congress, in amending and consolidating prior copyright legislation, has urged
that:
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centive given to an author is the exclusive right to publish and dis-
tribute his writings.3 This right has been somewhat limited by a
concern for the public dissemination of new ideas.' The fair use
A copyright is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writ-
ings, for the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statu-
tory rights, but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be promoted
by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.
The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress shall
have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit
of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are given.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
In construing copyright legislation, the Supreme Court has asserted that a copyright is
"the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts.'" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("ultimate aim [in enacting copyright laws] is
... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good"); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (rationale underlying copyright lies in benefits derived by the pub-
lic); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986) (goal
of copyright laws is to provide incentives for creative work). See also 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-31 to -32.2 (1986) (discussing Supreme Court interpretations
of purpose of copyright legislation). But see Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1498-
99 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985). "We agree that the Constitution
allows Congress to create copyright laws only if they benefit society as a whole rather than
authors alone.... But this does not mean that every copyright holder must offer benefits to
society, for the copyright is an incentive rather than a command." Id. (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides that:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the coyprighted work to the public
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomines, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) ... to display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id. Other provisions of the Act provide the copyright owner with a remedy for infringement
of these "exclusive rights." See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-10 (1982).
The Supreme Court has indicated that rewarding the author with exclusive rights in-
vites him to release his "creative genius" to the public. See United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). The Second Circuit has reinforced this point by
acknowledging that the aim of copyright laws is to stimulate artistic creativity for the public
by compensating the artist or author with financial motivation. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981). See also Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright (pt.
1), 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 508 (1945) (due to the "agreeable aimlessness" of authors, the
economic benefit of a copyright to their family will "blast" authors to work). Cf. Sobel,
Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SmMP. (AS-
CAP) 43, 79 (1971) (public better served by strong copyright laws).
I See Wainwright Secs., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). While section 106 pro-
vides an author with certain exclusive rights in his works, "It]he monopoly privileges that
FAIR USE DOCTRINE
doctrine5 attempts to strike a balance between the public's interest
Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special
private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984). Congress has imposed restrictions on these rights in order to balance the rights of an
author in his work against the rights of the public to dissemination of that work. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 107-18 (1982).
The approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright owner's exclusive rights
in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide various limitations, qualifica-
tions, or exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus, everything in section 106
is made "subject to sections 107 through 118," and must be read in conjunction
with those provisions.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5674 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
Lord Mansfield's eloquent statement made in Sayre v. Moore almost 200 years ago ap-
propriately describes the balance that must be achieved by the copyright laws.
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one,
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of thte commu-
nity, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity
and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor
the progress of the arts be retarded.
Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 n.6 (quoting Cary v. Longman, 1 East * 358, 362 n.(b), 102 Eng. Rep.
138, 140 n.(b) (1801)). See also Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.)
(sometimes copyrighter's financial interest must be subrogated to public good), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
I Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982)). The fair use statute reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id. This section, along with the majority of the Copyright Act of 1976, became effective on
January 1, 1978. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. I, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (1976). Section 107
represents the first statutory codification of the common-law fair use doctrine. See HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5678.
However, these four factors are not the exclusive criteria upon which a fair use determina-
tion is to be made. As a result, the legislative intent that the doctrine be flexible in its
application is achieved. See id. at 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5678-79.
Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its
19871
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and the copyright holder's interest by permitting restricted use of
protected works without compensation to the author when the
public's interest in the circulation of new ideas outweighs the crea-
tor's financial interest.' However, public use of unpublished works
denies an author his most powerful economic benefit-the right of
first publication. Recently, in Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,8
own facts.... [T]he courts have evolved a set of criteria which, though in no case
definitive or determinative, provide some gauge for balancing the equities.
Id. The legislative materials as well as judicial interpretations indicate that a case-by-case
approach is favored when applying the fair use doctrine. Id. at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5680. See also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d
Cir. 1977) (fair use cannot be determined by "arbitrary rules or fixed criteria"), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.)
(no principal can be set in copyright cases; use ad hoc method), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976). Commentators have also advocated the use of alternative criteria. See generally
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Ex-
pression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979) (examines first amendment implications instead of
fair use); Goldwag, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 29 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 8-14 (1983) (first amendment's effect upon application of fair use doc-
trine); Comment, When "Fair is Foul": A Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 218 (1986) (pub-
lic interest balancing analysis); Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where
Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1984) (necessity of the use test more appro-
priate than public interest).
For a comprehensive historical account of both English and American common law fair
use development, see J. LAWRENCE & B. TIMBERG, FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY 9-12 (1980)
(brief overview of 1976 Act fair use doctrine); W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPY-
RIGHT 6-64 (1985).
6 See H. BALL, supra note 1, at 260. "Fair use may be defined as a privilege in others
than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner with-
out his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." Id.
(footnote omitted). The constitutional policies of promoting science and useful arts has
made the creator's consent to reasonable use of his copyrighted works an implied prere-
quiste. See id. See also Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (fair use permits avoidance of rigid application of copy-
right laws which would stifle creativity it is intended to protect); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) (fair use offers means of balancing interest of public and
copyright holder), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Wainwright Secs., Inc. v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
7 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985). "Pub-
lication of an author's expression before he has authorized its dissemination seriously in-
fringes the author's right to decide when and whether it will be made public, a factor not
present in fair use of published works." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). "First
publication is inherently different from other § 106 rights in that only one person can be the
first publisher ...." Id. at 553. Therefore, because the potential damage to the author is
substanial, the balance of equities in evaluating a claim of fair use would shift. Id. The Act
of 1976 "recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, which
had previously been an element of the common-law protections afforded unpublished
works." Id. at 552. The Harper & Row Court observed that this right of first publication is
"expressly made subject to the fair use provision of § 107 ...." Id. Professor Nimmer has
FAIR USE DOCTRINE
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a biogra-
pher's use of an author's unpublished letters was not fair use.9
In Salinger, Ian Hamilton, a prominent literary figure,10 pre-
pared a biography of J.D. Salinger"- without the assistance or co-
operation of the reclusive Salinger.12 In his first draft, Hamilton
quoted liberally from unpublished letters written by Salinger 13
which had been uncovered in the libraries of Harvard, Princeton
and the University of Texas.14 Upon learning from this draft that
his letters had been donated to these libraries, Salinger registered
his copyright and protested Hamilton's use of these letters."" Ham-
ilton paraphrased most of the objectional material in his second
draft, and furnished a copy to Salinger.' Thereafter, Salinger
sought a preliminary injunction against publication of the revised
biography on the grounds of copyright infringement." After grant-
ing a temporary restraining order, the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York denied the preliminary injunction' 8 on
the grounds that Hamilton had made fair use of the limited
amount of protected material he had incorporated into the biogra-
phy.19 However, a limited stay against publication of the book was
granted pending an expedited appeal.20
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, granting Salinger the
stated that "a categorical presumption against pre-publication fair use cannot harmonize
with the statutory scheme." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A], at 13-75 n.28.1e (1986).
8 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987).
Id. at 100.
10 Id. at 92. Hamilton is a respected biographer of literary figures and is also a literary
critic for The London Sunday Times. See id.
Id. The biography is entitled J.D. Salinger: A Writing Life. Id.
12 Id. Salinger has maintained reclusive privacy for over thirty years. See Salinger v.
Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
" Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 417, 426.
1" See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 93. According to the district court, Hamilton "had little
success until his discovery" of the letters. See Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 416. Most of the
letters were written to Salinger's friends, including Judge Learned Hand and Ernest Hem-
ingway. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92-93. Before reviewing the letters, Hamilton executed form
agreements with the libraries limiting his use of the letters. Id. at 93.
11 Salinger, 811 F.2d at 93. He registered the copyright to seventy-nine of his unpub-
lished letters. Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 94.
'8 Id. at 92.
19 Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 426. The court reasoned that Salinger would suffer "mini-
mal" harm as a result of the use of his unpublished letters since the amount of copyright
protected material used by Hamilton was insubstantial. See id. at 423.
20 Salinger, 811 F.2d at 94.
19871
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preliminary injunction." Writing for the court, Judge Newman
noted that the author of unpublished letters is entitled to a copy-
right in those letters.22 Notwithstanding protection under the
Copyright Act, unpublished letters are subject to the defense of
fair use23 yet, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,24 fair use is to be
narrowly construed when the copyrighted work is unpublished. 5
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's approach in Harper & Row, the
Salinger court considered the four statutory factors comprising the
fair use defense. Although Hamilton's use of the copyrighted let-
ters to "enrich his scholarly biography" was appropriate,26 the Sa-
linger court stated that in light of the unpublished status of the
letters, such use is unlikely to be deemed "fair. '27 Additionally, the
amount of quoted and closely paraphrased protected "expressive
content" copied in the second draft was considered a "very sub-
stantial appropriation. '28 Finally, the court found that the biogra-
phy did not pre-empt the market for the letters, but its publication
would impair their economic potential to some extent.29 While
21 Id. at 100.
22 Id. at 94.
23 Id. at 95.
24 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court denied a finding of fair
use when the defendant, Nation Enterprises, used President Ford's unpublished memoirs
without the consent of plaintiff, Harper & Row, owner of the copyright, in a "news" story
one week before Harper & Row had scheduled publication. The Court placed much empha-
sis on the unpublished nature of the memoirs. Id. at 564.
21 See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95-97. The district court had merely established the fact
that unpublished works were subject to fair use. Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 421-22.
20 Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96.
27 Id. The court relied exclusively on the Harper & Row decision. See supra note 24.
28 Id. at 96, 98. The district court, on the other hand, found the use "minimal and
insubstantial." See Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 423. The district court's finding was based
upon the fact that "[a]lthough a large amount of information [was] taken from the letters,
and [was] of vital importance to the book, the information is not protected by the copy-
right." Id. (emphasis in original). The district court found only thirty instances where "pro-
tected material" was used and they were subsequently held to be "fair use." Id. The district
court applied the idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law, which establishes that only
the expression of the author and not the idea can be copyrighted, and found that very little
of the material used by Hamilton was in fact protected by Salinger's copyright. See id. at
418. Moreover, most of the information used from the unpublished letters was considered
not to be expression and thus unprotected. In contrast, the Second Circuit stated, even
applying the idea/expression dichotomy, that the use was substantial because both quotes
and close paraphrasing constitute infringement. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98.
29 See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99. In contrast, because the district court found the use of
protected material to be insignificant, it held that the use by Hamilton would have no sig-
nificant impact on the market. Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 425.
FAIR USE DOCTRINE
Hamilton would be permitted to report the facts contained in the
letters thereby preventing significant interference with the public's
interest in Salinger's life, Salinger had the right to protect the "ex-
pression" contained in his letters.3 0 The court held that the unpub-
lished nature of the letters, the amount of protected material cop-
ied and the effect on the "potential market" precluded a finding of
fair use notwithstanding the acceptable purpose of the use.3 '
The Second Circuit's denial of fair use in Salinger effectively
puts unpublished copyrighted works beyond the reach of the fair
use doctrine. Through unyielding adherence to judicially created
presumptions and without sufficiently pliable application of the
factors of fair use, it is submitted that the Second Circuit circum-
vented the purpose of copyright protection 32 by prohibiting the
public dissemination of Hamilton's scholarly biography. This Com-
ment will evaluate each of the factors of fair use and will suggest
alternative rationales that may be utilized as a more flexible ap-
proach in determining fair use.
THE FAIR USE FACTORS ANALYZED
When faced with a fair use defense, the court is not without
guidance, as it is statutorily instructed to consider the following
factors: the purpose of the use; the unpublished nature of the
work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used and the
effect of publication on the market.3 Moreover, the court must at-
tempt to categorize the use as one of ideas or expression because
under the idea/expression dichotomy, only the latter is within the
ambit of copyright protection. 4
Purpose of Use
The Second Circuit held that Hamilton's "purpose of use" was
clearly within the ambit of fair use.35 However, contrary to the dis-
1O Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100.
Id.
22 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 5 for a detailed discussion of these factors.
" See supra note 28 and infra note 53 and accompanying text.
" Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). "Notwithstanding the provisions
of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right." Id. The legislative history supports this finding. "The examples enumerated at page
24 of the Register's 1961 Report, while by no means exhaustive, give some idea of the sort of
1987]
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trict court's opinion, this use did not warrant "special considera-
tion." 6 It is submitted that special consideration was warranted,
not because Hamilton was caught in the "biographer's dilemma, 37
but because the biography is about a writer and as such, the mode
of expression of the subject, J.D. Salinger, can be more relevant
than the actual idea conveyed therein.3 8  Notwithstanding
activities the courts might regard as fair use ...: '... .quotation of short passages in a
scholarly or technical work, for illustration or clarification of the author's observations
.... .' HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5678. See also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (scholar deprived of use harms society as whole). The
Second Circuit adopted the concept that the commercial aspirations of the user do not di-
minish Hamilton's admirable purpose of use. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96.
Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97.
'7 Cf. id. at 96; Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 424. The dilemma is explained as follows: "[t]o
the extent [the biographer] quotes (or closely paraphrases), he risks a finding of infringe-
ment and an injunction effectively destroying his biographical work. To the extent he de-
parts from the words of the letters, he distorts, sacrificing both accuracy and vividness of
description." Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 424. The Second Circuit disagreed with the notion
that a biographer has a right to his subject's "accuracy" or "vividness." Salinger, 811 F.2d
at 96. "Indeed, 'vividness of description' is precisely an attribute of the author's expression
that he is entitled to protect." Id. See supra note 28 for a discussion of the idea/expression
dichotomy. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("protection is given only to
the expression of the idea"); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d
Cir.) ("the essence of infringement lies in taking not a general theme but its particular ex-
pression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization."),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 462
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (test is whether similarity is to ideas or manner of expression). See gener-
ally Denicola, supra note 5, at 292 (expression/idea dichotomy is intended to protect first
amendment rights).
'" See Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd in part, 560
F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
It is not sufficient ... for the defendants who wished to describe [the subjects']
thoughts and feelings to resort to "the obvious device of not quoting them di-
rectly." To do so would have prevented them from fully and accurately conveying
[the subjects'] own expression, which in this situation may be essential to an accu-
rate rendition of the relevant thoughts themselves. Furthermore, [the subjects']
expression itself may be a relevant part of the history relating to the case.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
One commentator has suggested that "[f]ree speech considerations should operate to
permit the use of expression only to the extent necessary to allow the users to make their
own contributions to the marketplace of ideas." See Denicola, supra note 5, at 309 (empha-
sis in original) (discussing Meeropol, 417 F. Supp. at 1212). It is submitted that Salinger's
"expression" is necessary in order to do a biography about him presuming, however, the use
of expression is kept to a minimum. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901) (the use should be deemed fair owing to its necessity). Cf. Wainwright Secs., Inc.
v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (fair use is intended to distin-
guish "a true scholar and a chisler who infringes a work for personal profit") (quoting Hear-
ings on Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright Law Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1706 (1966) (statement of John Schulman)).
FAIR USE DOCTRINE
Hamilton's personal opinion, 39 a biographer of a writer cannot use
the writer's expression to avoid penning a "pedestrian sentence"
himself.40 However, it is suggested that a strict application of the
idea/expression dichotomy in Salinger is neither reasonable nor in
furtherance of the ultimate goals of copyright law.4' In Time Inc.
v. Bernard Geis Associates,42 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York held the intended flexibility of the fair use
doctrine permitted a finding of fair use when the entire "expressive
content" of particular frames from the film of Kennedy's assassi-
nation were reproduced for historical and news purposes, even
under protest of the copyright owner. 43 Therefore, it is not without
precedent to suggest some "special consideration" for Hamilton.
The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The doctrine of fair use is intended to "adapt... to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis" 44 employing a "sensitive balanc-
ing of interests" 45 which "cannot be determined by resort to any
...fixed criteria. '4 It is submitted that the court's myopic al-
legience to the judicially created presumption of a "more limited"
"I See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96. When asked why he quoted a particular phrase rather
than describing what Salinger had done, Hamilton responded in a deposition" '[t]hat would
make a pedestrian sentence I didn't wish to put my name to.'" Id.
40 Id.
41 See supra note 2. By enjoining the dissemination of Hamilton's biography, it is sub-
mitted that the "progress of... useful Arts," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, was thwarted.
41 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
4' See id. at 144-46. In Bernard Geis, Thompson, a writer, used sketches of the "Za-
pruder film," the "most important photographic evidence concerning the fatal shots," for a
book he wrote in which he offered an alternative theory of President Kennedy's assasina-
tion. Id. at 131-32. To illustrate his theory, Thompson needed the film to which Time owned
the copyright and was granted permission by the court to use it because there was a "public
interest in having the fullest information available." Id. at 135, 146. See also Denicola,
supra note 5, at 300-10 (discussing Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.).
4 HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5680.
4' Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
40 Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and
objects of the selection made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sales, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.
Patry, supra note 5, at 20 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901)).
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application of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works47 was un-
faithful to the rationale of fair use.48
Absent this presumption, the facts of Salinger would suggest a
less favorable finding for Salinger with respect to this factor. The
letters, although not technically published by Salinger, were on
public display and a reference to the Princeton letters had been
published in a bibliography.49 Consequently, the classic reason for
limiting pre-publication use, preserving the original author's right
of first publication, is not entirely applicable?' Nor does Hamil-
47 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 554-55
(1985). "Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appear-
ance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use." Id. at 555.
48 See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d
57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980). "The doctrine of fair use, originally created and articulated in case
law, permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Id.
" Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 416. The letters were donated by their respective recipients
or their estates to the libraries. Id. In 1984, Garland Press, Inc. had printed a bibliography
of Salinger materials, edited by Jack Sublette, which used the letters located at Princeton.
Id. Salinger was unaware of this bibliography. Id. Whether the bibliography would be con-
sidered a publication is arguable. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 101 states in pertinent
part:
"Publication" is the distribution of copies ... of a work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to dis-
tribute copies.., to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution .... or
public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of work
does not of itself constitute publication.
Id. See also Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462, 464, 279
N.Y.S.2d 51, 55 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County) (no publication when literary work exhib-
ited for limited purpose), aff'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 633, 285 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1st Dep't 1967),
aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968). Compare Salinger, 811 F.2d
at 97 (letters publicly displayed) with Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555 (exclusivity of
memoirs in soon-to-be published state constituted unpublished status).
10 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 552-55
(1985) ("balance of inquiries" shifts to author only when material is unpublished). The
Harper & Row Court relied on the legislative history of the 1976 Act and stated that: "[t]he
applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited since, al-
though the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of the
copyright owner." Id. at 553 (quoting S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975)).
But see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 594-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing major-
ity's reliance on legislative history when face of statute indicates application of section 106
is subject to section 107); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.05[A][2], at 13-75 (1987) ("[t]he
scope of the fair use doctrine is considerably narrower with respect to unpublished works
which are held confidential by their copyright owners") (citing Association of Am. Medical
Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd per curiam, 734 F.2d 3 (3d
Cir. 1984)). It is submitted, however, that the facts of Salinger do not support the conten-
tion that works which the author desires to keep from the public should be subject to more
than protection of first publication rights. The letters in the present case were written and
mailed by Salinger and the recipients donated them to the various universities. They were
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ton's use sufficiently thwart the economic objective underlying pro-
tection of the author's right of first publication.51 Finally, "[i]t has
never been the purpose of the copyright laws to restrict the dis-
semination of information about persons in the public eye even
though those concerned may not welcome the resulting public-
ity."52 It is suggested that through reliance on this presumption
the Second Circuit inadequately accounted for the particular facts
in this case which tend to negate the usually detrimental effects of
pre-publication use.
Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Copyright laws protect only the author's "expression" and not
his ideas. 3 It is imperative when evaluating the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used, to first determine the nature of the
alleged infringement.5 4 The difficulty of this task is evidenced by
the polar results reached by the two courts; the district court
found "insignificant" appropriation while the Second Circuit found
a "very substantial appropriation."55 Without attempting to recon-
on public display and available to users of the research facilities. See Note, Personal Let-
ters: In Need of a Law of their Own, 44 IOWA L. REv. 705, 705-12 (1959) (discussing unique
needs of letters in copyright and privacy areas).
51 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542 (unpublished nature of manuscript worth $25,000
to Time). In the present case, it is submitted, there is no tangible negative economic impact
on Salinger as existed in Harper & Row.
'2 See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966)
(Lumbard, J., concurring), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). In Rosemont, Howard Hughes
sought to prevent a biographer's use of articles on his life; the court upheld the biographer's
right to use them. Id. at 304. It has been suggested that the copyright owner's desire to
suppress information solely to preserve anonymity can be considered in a fair use defense.
See id. at 311 (Lumbard, J., concurring); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). See generally Gordon, Fair Use as Market Fail-
ure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1632-34 (1982) (anti-dissemination motives and fair use). It is submit-
ted that Salinger, a recluse, had a similar motive to that of Hughes and that the court
erroneously failed to consider this motive in its decision.
53 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Section 102(b) states that: "In'no case does copyright pro-
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea ... regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id. See HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 56, 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5670.
See also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (theme of play not
copyrightable because idea); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 1.10[B][2], at 1-72 to -74.1 (1987)
(discussion of idea/expression dichotomy).
" Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 418.
Compare Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 423 (use of less than 2% of copyrighted protected
material in biography is considered insignificant) with Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97-98 (utiliza-
tion of one-third of 17 letters and at least 10% of 42 letters protected by copyright is very
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cile these divergent interpretations, it is submitted that the histori-
cal value of the Hamilton biography should have tempered the
weight afforded this factor by the Second Circuit.
The significant public interest in historical and biographical
works traditionally supersedes the economic interest of the copy-
right owner. 6 Thus, historical works, which are broadly defined in
this context,57 are subject to less copyright protection permitting
more extensive "appropriate" use.58 In Meeropol v. Nizer,59 the
substantial appropriation). "[T]he determination of the extent of similarity which will con-
stitute a substantial and hence infringing similarity presents one of the most difficult ques-
tions in copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations." 3
M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 13.03[A], at 13-20 (1987) (emphasis in original). See also Peter
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("test for in-
fringement of a copyright is of necessity vague"). Other examples of court determinations of
substantiality of infringement abound. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65 (actual
amount insubstantial but was "heart of the book"); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (fair use found even though entire work copied on video-
cassette recorder); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(literal duplication was de minimus, similarity substantial, but no infringement); Martin
Luther King Jr. Center v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(court outlines number of sentences which constituted substantial quoting), rev'd on other
grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
" See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). The narrowness of protection for copyrighted works of historical
importance is essential for the furtherance of historical knowledge. Id. "[Aibsent wholesale
usurpation of another's expression, claims of copyright infringement where works of history
are at issue are rarely successful." Id.
Biographies, of course, are fundamentally personal histories and it is both reason-
able and customary for biographers to refer to and utilize earlier works, . . . re-
search and occasionally to quote directly from such works. This practice is permit-
ted because of the public benefit in encouraging the development of historical and
biographical works and their public distribution.
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (citation omitted). See also Patry, supra note 5, at 65 (biographi-
cal and historical research generally not available for copyright). But see Hill, Copyright
Protection for Historical Research: A Defense of the Minority View,. 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 14 (1984) (need for re-evaluation of prevailing view of how historical research is
protected).
V7 Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978). "[Tlhe definition of an historical work for the purpose of the fair use doctrine is very
broad one." Id. Cf. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 308 (worthiness of biographies in historical stud-
ies discussed).
11 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 1986) (scholarly use presumptively fair; commercial use presumptively unfair); Martin
Luther King Jr. Center v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (fair use more readily found where use is for educational, historical or scientific pur-
poses), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp.
940, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("the copying must be even more substantial to constitute infringe-
ment when historical works are involved").
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court suggested that the quoting of "expression" was permissible
because "[the] expression itself may be a relevant part of the his-
tory."8 0 While most commentators and courts would not go this
far,"1 it is suggested that in light of the historical value of the Sa-
linger biography, a more liberal interpetation of "protected" and
"unprotected" material was appropriate.
Effect on the Market
The "effect on the market" has been called the "most impor-
tant" element of fair use because copyright protection is based
upon the theory that by providing the author with an economic
incentive through copyright protection, he will continue to produce
for the public's benefit.62 Consequently, if the author is economi-
cally injured by an infringement, the incentive to produce is pre-
sumably rendered ineffectual.6" The injury does not have to be ac-
tual; a potential harm capable of ruining an author's "opportunity"
for an economic benefit is sufficient. 4 The Salinger court stated
that it was unlikely that the biography would displace the market
" 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
10 Id. at 1212.
"' See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100 (expression is protected); Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F.
Supp. 727 (D. Ariz. 1985) (fair use factors not even applied to use of unpublished letters);
Denicola, supra note 5, at 309 (suggests first amendment criteria rather than distorting "fair
use" in Meeropol).
62 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 ("[tlhis last factor is undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use"). "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare... ." Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 426 (1984) (copying is "fair use 'because there is no accompanying reduction in the
market for plaintiff's original work.' "); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir.
1981) (must balance harm to author against harm to public); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (if effect on market is minimal greater use is privileged), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
63 See Sobel, supra note 3, at 78.
If every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a compet-
ing publisher, publishers would soon stop publishing books that serviced the pub-
lic interest. Authors, who usually rely on royalties for payment, would stop writing
anything that might be in the public interest and therefore be ineligible for copy-
right protection.
Id.
6, Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99 (some market impairment seems likely); see, e.g., Sony, 464
U.S. at 450-51 (examines effect on potential market and prospect of "some meaningful like-
lihood of future harm."); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984)
(looks to potential markets, not fact that program is not actively marketed), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
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for Salinger's letters and that few potential purchasers would be
dissuaded by its publication. 5 Nevertheless, the court held this
factor "slightly" in Salinger's favor.6 6 The effect on the market in
this instance would be negligible, if not positive." Moreover, most
authors do not write letters to their friends with an "economic
benefit" in mind and this reality should have been considered by
the court when evaluating the fair use factor.
CONCLUSION
The injunction against Hamilton's biography should have been
lifted because the potential harm to Salinger from Hamilton's use
was slight in comparison to the harm the injunction imposed on
the public. The intentional flexibility of the fair use doctrine was
clearly in conflict with the court's reliance on the presumption of
"more limited" application of fair use to unpublished work. The
letters were neither confidentially held nor more valuable because
of their exclusivity. When a biographical work of historical value is
involved, a more lenient standard of "substantial appropriation"
should be employed. Finally, when the facts clearly indicate that
the effect on the author's market would be minimal and the public
need is great, the biographer should be deemed to have made "fair
use" of the material.
Catherine A. Diviney
65 See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99.
66 Id.
67 See Bawer, Salinger's Arrested Development, THE NEW CRITERION, Sept. 1986, at 34.
"[I]t seems likely that Ian Hamilton's forthcoming para-biography, J.D. Salinger: A Writing
Life, will generate an enormous amount of interest. I call it a 'para-biography' because ...
Mr. Hamilton . . . has simply been unable to gather enough material to produce a full-
fledged biography of Salinger." Id. at 34-35.
But it should be recalled, in the middle of all the lawyering, that the dispute is
about literature. And the literary significance of the present dispute is not large
. . . Hamilton's book, some 200 pages long, is not a weighty one. It does have a
wryness that is worthy of its subject, and it makes the most of its scarce source
material ... still, by and large the writer's elusiveness remains undiminished by
this book. His retreat from the world has not been denied him.
Delbanco, Holden Caulfield Goes to Law School, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1987, at 27-28.
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